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5About the Project
At the beginning of the twenty-ﬁ rst century, the real challenge of 
reconstructing Southeast Europe is reinventing Southeast Europe.
Th e “Agenda for Civil Society in Southeast Europe” was a three-
year research project coordinated by the Center for Policy Studies at the 
Central European University, Budapest and involving the New Europe 
College in Bucharest, the Centre for Liberal Strategies in Soﬁ a, the 
Wissenschaftskolleg in Berlin, and others. Th e project started with the 
assumption that the region’s invention requires the construction of a 
common regional vision and the emergence of a regional public debate. 
Th e project—surrealistically nicknamed Blue Bird—was an attempt to 
formulate such a vision and to assist the emergence of a civic regional 
debate. Until now, the region has been perceived in the terms of risks; 
the idea of the project was to refor mulate the debate on the future in 
terms of opportunities.
Th e project’s primary ambition was to reﬂ ect on the reconstruction 
of Southeast Europe, both as an intellectual challenge and a policy 
challenge. Th e current debate has never addressed the production 
of knowledge and innovative ideas about the region as a distinctive 
problem. Th e international community fails to recognize the lack of 
local knowledge as a speciﬁ c and powerful obstacle for the region’s 
development. Th is is one of the reasons why the academic community 
and the intellectual community in general remained marginal in the 
initial stages of debate about what to do in the Balkans. Th e urgency of 
the problems and the extremely limited time for debate on what should 
be done resulted in the recycling of the old ideas and approaches.
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Th e present project started with the assumption that the recon-
struction of the Balkans is an intellectual problem. In the last decade, 
Western and Southeast Europe have developed in completely diﬀ erent 
directions and have worked with completely diﬀ erent maps of the 
future. In the Western part of the continent, the integration process has 
reached a critical stage with the launching of the common European 
currency, the euro. Th is has led to fundamental reconsideration of such 
basic concepts as the nation-state, sovereignty, the national economy, 
national security, human rights, and so on. At the same time, the process 
of disintegration in the southeast part of the continent brought back 
some nineteenth-century ideas about the role of states and borders, the 
value of economic independence, and so on. Th ere is an urgent need 
for a policy dialogue about the future of the Balkans that can help local 
and international players involved in the process to “see” the diﬀ erence 
between their perceptions of the existing situation. 
Th e existence of the European Union and the will of Southeast 
Europe to join it make the dialogue on the future more diﬃ  cult, rather 
than easier. Th e temporal utopia of communism is replaced by the 
spatial utopia of the present EU. Consensus on joining the EU conceals 
the lack of debate on the future. 
Understanding the intellectual challenge of development has 
persuaded us to avoid the accession type of questions in searching 
for new innovative ideas regarding Southeast Europe. Th e project’s 
ambition was to stimulate researchers to integrate their ﬁ ndings in the 
common product and not to focus on their own projects.
Th is policy document, “In Search of Responsive Government,” 
aims to serve as a vision paper for de velopment of the region. Th e paper 
addresses both governments and publics and tries to oﬀ er coherent 
policy strategies. Th e paper is aimed to be a stimulus for opening the 
dis cussion to diﬀ erent sectors of society and for initiating regional 
policy debate. 
7“In Search of Responsive Government” is a collective product of 
the Blue Bird project edited by Ivan Krastev, the research coordinator 
of the project. Ivo Bicanic, Georgy Ganev, Venelin Ganev, Vladimir 
Gligorov, Ilian Mihov and Alina Mungiu-Pippidi made outstanding 
contributions to this paper.
Th e Blue Bird project was sponsored by a consortium of inter-
national donors, including:
• Central European University;
• Th e Volkswagen Foundation;
• Th e Bank of Sweden Tercentenary Foundation;
• Th e German Federal Ministry for Education and Research;
• Matra Project Program of the Dutch Ministry of Foreign Aﬀ airs;
• Stifterverband für die Deutsche Wissenschaft;
• Regional Bureau for Europe and the CIS of the United Nations 
Development Programme.
Th e Wissenschaftskolleg zu Berlin provided generous help in 
launching and running the project throughout its three years of 
activity.
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State Building and Economic Growth in the Balkans
Why is economic growth not generating support for market capitalism and 
why is state weakness reproduced in the Balkans? Th ese two questions are at 
the center of our report, which challenges two assumptions at the heart of 
the present policy paradigm. It shows that economic growth is not suﬃ  cient 
to create a social base for a market society and that state building in the 
Balkans can not and should not be simply reduced to an EU-guided reform 
of public administrations. State building should be viewed primarily as a 
constituency building.
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1 .  G E T T I N G  I N C E N T I V E S  R I G H T,  
 G E T T I N G  P E R C E P T I O N S  R I G H T
Th e policy message coming from the latest academic literature on 
growth is that the paradigm should be changed from a focus on direct 
policy intervention to a focus on the economic environment. Instead of 
seeking growth-promoting policies, we view the task of lifting growth 
rates in the region as a question of establishing the right environment 
for growth. Policy intervention still has a place, but it is not an inter-
vention to augment growth factors like capital and labor but rather 
to create the incentives for physical and human capital accumulation. 
How, in this context, should we understand the possibility of achieving 
sustainable economic growth in Southeast Europe?
1 . 1  T h e  C u r r e n t  S i t u a t i o n  i n  t h e  R e g i o n
Improving the standard of living in Southeast Europe can be achieved 
by following growth-promoting reforms at three levels: national, intra-
regional, and through integration with the EU. Regional cooperation 
is often viewed as a list of initiatives and policies that might help the 
economies in Southeast Europe lift their growth potential. To make 
some progress on the implementation of such policies, it is useful to 
group them in three categories:
• Trade integration. Tariﬀ  and nontariﬀ  barriers to trade must be 
removed and incentives created for trade cooperation. 
• Infrastructure that facilitates trade and capital ﬂ ows. Th ere is a 
substantial role for international donors in reforming the physical 
infrastructure.
• Legal arrangements between countries that facilitate handling of 
private or public claims against parties in other countries. 
With all this said, however, our research from the past three years 
illustrates that, while regional cooperation could be useful in promo-
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ting growth, in most countries of the region, the key impediments to 
growth lie at the national level. In other words, before embarking on 
a concerted eﬀ ort to increase the region’s growth rates, each country 
must work at improving the national conditions for growth, which is 
also a critical factor for the success of EU integration policies. In this 
report, our discussion focuses on the national institutional and policy 
reforms required to improve economic well-being in the region. 
 To understand why some policies work and others do not, we ﬁ rst 
examine regional growth in the past three years as well as the most 
recent data on GDP per capita.
Table 1
GDP Per Capita in 2001 and Growth of Real GDP Per Capita 2000–2002
GDP per capita
[in USD at PPP] 
Growth 2000–2002
[% average annual]
Albania 4,040 6.77
Bosnia and Herzegovina 5,800 6.00
Bulgaria 6,840 4.73
Croatia 9,760 3.97
Greece 18,240 4.10
Macedonia 6,210 0.10
Romania 6,290 3.87
Serbia 6,380 5.17
Slovenia 17,690 3.57
Turkey 6,120 2.57
Area average 8,737 4.09
 excluding Greece and Slovenia 6,430 4.15
EU average 24,900 2.03
Source: World Bank, World Development Indicators 2000–02 and other selected tables.
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Th e question is not how to generate growth; it already exists in 
most countries (with the exception of Macedonia). Th e key question is 
whether the current growth rate is sustainable and, more importantly, 
whether the growth that does exist is suﬃ  cient to ensure political and 
social stability. Th e region’s average growth rate for the past three years 
(4.15% p.a.) seems rather low. At this rate, after 50 years, the region 
will have reached only 75% of the EU average. Increasing the growth 
rate from 4.15 to 6%, which is feasible for most countries, will reduce 
the period by almost one half—to 27 years. 
1 . 2  W h a t  D r i v e s  G r o w t h ?
Economic growth is a result of factor accumulation—human and 
physical capital—and of productivity improvements. Th e empirical 
and theoretical literature has identiﬁ ed many factors that promote 
growth—macroeconomic stability, legal environment, political and 
social stability, taxation, competition, trade, and so on. It is important, 
however, to keep in mind that most of these factors aﬀ ect growth be-
cause they create the environment for higher investment (in physical 
or human capital). Even more fundamentally, these factors aﬀ ect sa-
ving—the willingness of consumers to forgo current consumption for 
the sake of future consumption. In short, growth in poor countries is 
driven by investment, and investment is ﬁ nanced by saving. And, of 
course, saving might take the form of physical or human capital.
In an open economy that allows for capital ﬂ ows in and out of the 
country, local investment can be ﬁ nanced by foreign savings. Th is is 
the case, for example, with the much desired foreign direct investment. 
Many policy discussions have focused on how to attract foreign inves-
tors, with many observers arguing that, in poor countries, it is diﬃ  cult 
to muster large savings pools that will ﬁ nance investment. Historically, 
this argument is largely incorrect. Most fast growing economies have 
been growing by domestic savings, not foreign. Today, one of the fastest 
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growing economies in the world is China, which, over the past decade, 
averages a growth rate of about 10% per annum. In China, net foreign 
direct investment constitutes only about 15% of total investment. Do-
mestic saving ﬁ nances the other 85%. China is poorer than any of the 
economies in Southeast Europe (except Albania). It is certainly worth 
pointing out that China is not an isolated case. Th e same is true for 
Singapore or for a transition economy like Hungary. Th e lesson is that 
an economy must possess high rates of domestic savings to grow fast. 
If saving is so important, how can the region’s governments increase 
saving rates? Th ere are two groups of policy and institutional reforms: 
(1) policies that are explicitly designed to raise the saving rate; (2) 
policies and institutions that create the environment for high savings. 
As an example of the ﬁ rst, one can point to various tax reliefs for saving. 
Such policies are implemented in many developed economies. In the 
US, savings for retirement under certain conditions are exempted from 
taxation; in most European countries, income from various savings 
accounts is not taxable. Th e key point is that there are policies that 
can be directly targeted at improving the economy’s savings rate. But, 
of course, these policies are not the panacea. After all, the saved funds 
must bring the necessary return to justify the sacriﬁ ce of consumption. 
Environmental factors play a bigger role in this respect.
Th e environmental factors are subtler and potentially more impor-
tant because they create a transparent and coherent structure of incen-
tives to save and invest. A list of such factors is:
• Macroeconomic stability. When inﬂ ation is rather stable and low, 
consumers are more willing to commit their funds to savings 
because they know that unexpected inﬂ ation will not erode their 
savings.
• Political and social stability. Rapid political and social changes create 
an environment of uncertainty and sharp policy shifts. When 
consumers do not like risk, they will be less willing to save under 
precarious political conditions.
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• Legal environment. It is a tautology to state that the observance of 
property rights is fundamental for saving. Th e fear of expropriation 
leads to low rates of saving.
• Financial stability. Th e banking sector plays a key role in channeling 
savings into productive uses. If the banking system is unstable, 
consumers will shy away from putting their money in banks, and 
there will be fewer funds to be lent. Investment will decrease and 
with it, rates of economic growth.
It is important to point out that increasing savings is among the 
critical indicators for success of reforms because the level of savings is 
not only an indicator of the environment but also an expression of the 
general trust in the political and economic system.
1 . 3  W h a t  D o e s  a n d  D o e s  N o t  Wo r k  
  i n  t h e  R e g i o n ?
Reports on the region tend to overlook the achievements in Southeast 
Europe. It is worth pointing out that many prerequisites for rapid 
growth are already present in most countries in the region. First, there 
has been signiﬁ cant progress in achieving political and social stability. 
Second, many countries have achieved single-digit inﬂ ation rates. 
Th ere are, however, three countries with inﬂ ation above 10%—Turkey, 
Romania, and Serbia and Montenegro. Progress in the other two 
environmental factors is much more varying. Most judicial systems still 
require signiﬁ cant reform not only to ensure that property rights are 
observed but also that the system functions smoothly, and cases are tried 
promptly. Similarly, reform of the ﬁ nancial sector is at diﬀ erent stages. 
While Bulgaria has fully privatized its banking sector and isolated it 
completely from government intervention, in other countries, such as 
Turkey, the banking sector still requires signiﬁ cant reform. 
Increasing savings is among 
the critical indicators for 
success of reforms because the 
level of savings is not only an 
indicator of the environment 
but also an expression of the 
general trust in the political 
and economic system
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But despite the recent progress in stabilizing the economic and po-
litical environment, saving is still very low in the region. While other 
countries in transition, like the Czech Republic and Hungary, have 
managed to sustain a saving rate of over 25%, countries in Southeast 
Europe have negative rates or rates below 15%. And again the saving 
rate depends on many behavioral characteristics, but it is not neces-
sarily linked to the wealth of the nation. China is poorer than any of 
the Southeast European economies but has a savings rate three times 
higher than the regional average. Clearly, a large part of the discrepancy 
between savings in the fast growing Asian economies and the Southeast 
European countries can be explained by so-called cultural factors, but 
there is certainly room for policy intervention. Saving does respond to 
incentives and when the economic environment is right, savings will 
also increase in Southeast Europe. 
Table 2 
Domestic Savings as Percent of GDP
Domestic savings in 2000 [% of GDP]
Albania
Bosnia and Herzegovina
Bulgaria
Croatia
Greece
Macedonia
Romania
Serbia
Slovenia
Turkey
–2.90
–10.30
10.97
16.37
13.86
–0.41
13.63
–4.46
24.24
16.78
Central European economies
 Czech Republic
 Hungary
 Poland
25.98
26.49
19.58
Some fast growing economies
 China
 Korea
 Singapore
39.94
31.44
49.76
Source: World Bank, World Development Indicators 2000.
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Th e low rate of saving is even more troubling in the context of the 
regional saving patterns from the last half a century. Why, in the former 
communist countries, did we see a change from the high saving regime 
prior to 1989 to a regime of negligible saving rates? Certainly the fact 
that, to a large degree, saving was forced before 1989 explains the dif-
ference. But, from a policy point of view, a more important reason is 
the macroeconomic and ﬁ nancial instability that followed 1989. High 
inﬂ ation rates and banking crises melted the public’s savings. In such 
an environment of instability and uncertainty, saving seems undesirab-
le. Th e governments’ failure to create an environment enhancing high 
private domestic saving is the strategic challenge for sustainable deve-
lopment in the region. If sustainable growth is to be thinkable, savings 
rates must increase.
1 . 4  T h e  L o w  R a t e s  o f  S a v i n g s  
  a n d  t h e  L a c k  o f  P u b l i c  S u p p o r t  f o r  R e f o r m
Many reasons for the low rates of saving may be pointed out, but one 
merits special attention from a fundamental (paradigmatic) policy 
point of view—the lack of public support for market capitalism. If 
there are no major social groups supporting government policies, even 
when they are the correct ones with respect to achieving sustainable 
growth and development, these policies are bound to be unsustainable 
in the long run and ultimately will fail. Th is is because lack of public 
support for policies is associated with a low level of optimism about 
the future and low levels of conﬁ dence among major social actors that 
the country is going in the right direction. Th is means that the major 
potential domestic savers’ subjective evaluation of the expected returns 
to their investments (the reward for saving rather than consuming) 
is relatively low compared with the corresponding negative eﬀ ect on 
their propensity to save. Th e ﬁ nal result is that people do not have an 
incentive to forgo current consumption and invest in their personal 
future, as well as the future of their society. In other words, it is not 
It is not enough to get 
incentives right; it is necessary 
to get public perceptions right 
to sustain economic growth.
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enough to get incentives right; it is necessary to get public perceptions 
right to sustain economic growth. Th e rise of public optimism and the 
rise of public trust in institutions are key indicators for the success of 
the long-term economic growth. 
When the members of a society do not see a reason to invest in the 
future, they generally do not do it because saving is costly, and they do 
not see any beneﬁ t from suﬀ ering for this cost. A lack of investment 
in the future means that the overwhelming majority of economic 
actors choose not to increase the stock of productive physical capital 
(buildings and machinery); not to improve their and their children’s 
knowledge, skills, and abilities to engage in value-adding eﬀ orts; not to 
overcome the obstacles of developing and adopting new technologies; 
and not to cooperate with society for the sake of the future. All exis-
ting and conceivable models of economic growth predict that when all 
this is the case, the economy’s productive capacity does not grow, and, 
short- to medium-term ﬂ uctuations notwithstanding, the society has 
virtually no long-term development prospects.1
1 . 5  G r o w t h  D o e s  N o t  N e c e s s a r i l y  L e a d  t o  
  P u b l i c  S u p p o r t
A paradigm that has been around since the beginning of transition, but 
has not been tested empirically, is that once economic growth resumes 
after a period of restructuring, a healthy social base for capitalism 
and a functioning market economy will inevitably follow. In other 
words, the assumption has been that consistently following the correct 
policies will naturally lead to the emergence of signiﬁ cant supportive 
constituencies. Th ese constituencies will become social owners of the 
reform process and will position their plans, energies, and optimism 
1 William Easterly and Ross Levine, “It’s not Factor Accumulation: Stylized Facts and 
Growth Models,” Th e World Bank Economic Review 15:2 (2001).
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within the reform agenda, increasing their belief in the future, with all 
the potential positive eﬀ ects on economic dynamics that this brings.
Two recent examples of this often quite implicit and hidden para-
digm can be outlined brieﬂ y here, both coming from the World Bank, 
a leader in the analysis of both transition and Southeast Europe. Th e 
ﬁ rst example comes from the regional strategy paper “Road to Stability 
and Prosperity in Southeast Europe.” Th e report argues that reforms 
and intraregional integration must be combined with a clearly deﬁ ned 
path for European integration because it “will anchor expectations and 
provide both an incentive for reform and intra-regional cooperation” 
(p. 9). Th e assumption is that clarifying the ultimate goal (prosperity—
in other words, getting rich through growth and European integration) 
will create its own support.
Th e second example is also from a World Bank report. In “Transiti-
on: Th e First Ten Years,” the assumption is much more deeply hidden, 
reﬂ ecting the World Bank’s increasing knowledge about the reform 
process. Th e paper quite correctly states that it is not only market dis-
cipline (the traditional Washington consensus package) but also the 
encouragement of new ﬁ rms and entrepreneurs that is important for 
development (p. xvii). It goes on to state, even more accurately, that 
encouragement is provided through incentives. Th e subtle diﬀ erence 
is that “putting incentives in place” reﬂ ects the policymaker’s point of 
view, while “supporting reforms” reﬂ ects people’s perceptions about 
these incentives. In the report’s analytical framework, the two are equ-
ally important. Th e assumption, again, is that having the right policies 
and the right incentives in place will naturally lead people to actively 
use them. As Easterly demonstrates convincingly, you may have in-
centives in place, but because of externalities like “leaks, matches and 
traps,” it may be completely rational for individuals not to take advan-
tage of them.2
The experience in Southeast 
Europe so far does not provide 
evidence that the “growth 
buys support” assumption is 
realistic.
2 William Easterly, Th e Elusive Quest for Growth: Economists’ Adventures and 
Misadventures in the Tropics (Cambridge, Mass: MIT Press, 2002), pp. 145–170.
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Th e experience in Southeast Europe so far does not provide eviden-
ce that the “growth buys support” assumption is realistic. From 1998–
2002, most Southeast European countries implemented a rich package 
of reforms. Weaknesses of implementation notwithstanding, these were 
the right reforms in terms of being reasonable for growth and creating 
incentives to engage in saving and productive activity. Southeast Euro-
pean countries have experienced healthy economic growth, especially 
in per capita terms, but any social base supporting markets and capi-
talism is diﬃ  cult to ﬁ nd. In fact, surveys of public opinion in 2002 
indicate a coincident to the period of economic growth and very low 
levels of public trust in democratically elected institutions.3 Th e surveys 
also note a trend of collapsing expectations regarding the future. Th is is 
illustrated in Table 1.
3 Data from Krastev, Ivan, Th e Inﬂ exibility Trap: Frustrated Societies, Weak States and 
Democracy. Report on the State of Democracy in the Balkans. (Soﬁ a: Centre for Liberal 
Strategies, 2003), pp. 5–6; and International IDEA: International Institute for 
Democracy and Electoral Assistance.
Table 3
Actual Per Capita Income Growth vs. Perceptions of Moving in the Right Direction
Country Cumulative percentage change 
in income per capita 1997–2002
Percent people feeling the country 
is going in the right direction in 2002
Albania
Bosnia and Herzegovina
Bulgaria
Croatia
Macedonia
Romania
Serbia and Montenegro
+35
+33
+29
+15
+6
+7
–6
N/A
23
18
28
18
34
49
Source: For GDP and population—WIIW, WIIW Balkan Observatory, http://www.wiiw.ac.at/balkan/data.
html;
  For Perceptions—International IDEA, Complete Quantitative Survey Results, http://www.idea.int/
balkans/survey_detailed.cfm
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Th e fact that one of the countries furthest ahead in terms of eco-
nomic and institutional reform (Bulgaria) also enjoys one of the lo-
west levels of trust in institutions, appreciation of public services, and 
optimism for the future (see Figure 1) is especially telling. It strongly 
questions the assumption that economic growth and accession to the 
EU naturally builds proreform constituencies. Th is evidence should be 
enough to examine the assumption and to contemplate what the imp-
lications of abandoning it may be. 
Bulgaria is very interesting in illustrating this so-called experience 
gap, the discrepancy between objective and subjective realities in the 
Balkans. According to a set of objective indicators, 19.8% of respon-
100
105
110
115
120
125
15
20
25
30
35
40
1998 1999 2000 2001 2002
GDP (1997=100) Optimism
GDP Optimism
Figure 1
GDP and Optimism in Bulgaria, 1998–2002
Source: For GDP—National Statistical Institute, Bulgaria;
  For Optimism—BBSS Gallup International, Annual data averaging monthly data; percent positive 
responses to the question “Is Bulgaria heading in the right direction?”
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dents in a double nationally representative sample qualify as winners 
of the reforms (the policies and the incentives have actually worked for 
them), but only 5.8% actually identify themselves as winners (in other 
words, perceive that policies and incentives have worked for them). 
In the current Bulgarian political reality, a social group representing 
20% of the population is completely capable of dominating the 
agenda. A group of less than 6% is not. In Bulgaria, the correct policies 
and incentives have been in place for six years. What is missing is the 
perception that the policies and incentives are there.
1 . 6  W h y  D o e s  G r o w t h  N o t  G e n e r a t e  
  I t s  O w n  S u p p o r t ?
Examining the assumption that economic growth, sustained over a 
medium-term, leads to public support for economic reforms should 
start by questioning the importance of this assumption in terms of 
policy decisions. Th is assumption has indeed been important in setting 
agendas and policies in the Balkans. It is in the very fundament of the 
external conditionality imposed on policy makers across the Balkan 
region as a necessary condition for sustainable development. Th e logic 
of external conditionality is that if economic development is to be 
consolidated and sustained, a period of growth leading to stabilization 
and rising incomes is needed. Th is period will inevitably create the 
social base supporting the deepening of structural and policy reforms, 
without which the ultimate goal of sustainable development seems 
unachievable. Th e idea was that growth not only creates wealth but 
votes as well.
Given the importance of the assumption that growth leads to social 
support for reforms, its failure to be empirically validated in the Balkans 
must be explained. Some possible reasons may be that the time period 
under examination is still too short, that growth is very unevenly dist-
ributed, gains accrue to a very small constituency, that optimism is not 
I N  S E A R C H  O F  R E S P O N S I V E  G O V E R N M E N T  
25
solely dependent on material status and perspectives, and that many 
perceive growth as unfair.
For example, market reforms are by deﬁ nition associated with a loss 
of security. Th is includes insecurity on a personal and property level but 
also insecurity in terms of social status and perspectives. Status uncer-
tainty means that previously prestigious groups have lost status, while 
at the same time, the new elites are aware that they can lose their status 
easily, especially when political changes take place, with clientelist net-
works changing with them. And political changes have occurred after 
every election in the Balkans since the beginning of reforms.
In addition, market reforms are correlated with increased inequa-
lity, which is easy to be perceived as unfairly achieved and undesirable 
on moral grounds. People who perceive inequality as unfair, or unfairly 
achieved, tend to consider themselves losers from the reform process 
regardless of the dynamics of their personal consumption paths. Th is 
perception is magniﬁ ed by the activities of two types of actors: populist 
politicians whose election strategies are based on winning a protest vote 
where the protest is against unfairness, and media with a heavy spin bias.
All of this is experienced as impoverishment, especially against the 
background of people’s expectations, which are endemic and impervio-
us to empirical studies, according to which the economy and economic 
welfare is a zero sum game, and the future is unimportant relative to the 
present. Because of this, when evaluating a politician or a policy, social 
actors give much weight to policies’ short-term wealth redistribution 
eﬀ ects, while giving absolutely no weight to their long-term wealth 
creation eﬀ ects.
Th ere are two corollaries to these mental models. First, they under-
lie the widespread belief that a better situation is not only possible but 
easily achievable, usually by means of redistributive political will rather 
than through capitalist market interaction. Second, not only is there a 
lack of appreciation for market reforms (their sole aim is to increase the 
economy’s long-term wealth creation capacity, and, as such, they are 
practically irrelevant to the social actors), but there is an inability and 
People who perceive 
inequality as unfair, or unfairly 
achieved, tend to consider 
themselves losers from the 
reform process regardless of 
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lack of desire among social actors to learn the workings of the market 
economy and economic policies. Th e data from most transition count-
ries indicate a certain “blindness for success,” namely, the majority of 
respondents attribute success to corruption and unethical behavior.
Th us, we see that there is a lack of support for policies aiming to 
increase the economy’s long-term capacity to create wealth even when 
these policies do have results and do lead to growth. Th is leads to the 
question about the relevance of relaxing the assumption that growth 
generates its own support for the appropriate policy mix. Th ere is a 
need for a second policy track that targets perceptions, not incentives.
 
1 . 7  G e t t i n g  I n c e n t i v e s  R i g h t
Th e success of this second policy track depends on the government’s 
ability to come up with the right incentives.
Macroeconomic and ﬁ nancial stability in some countries is still 
lacking. Although recent institutional reforms and policy changes 
stabilized economies, reform is still incomplete. From a policy pers-
pective, macroeconomic stability has several dimensions, with the two 
most important being monetary and ﬁ scal policy. Monetary stability 
is manifested in a low and stable inﬂ ation rate. Governments are often 
tempted to use monetary policy for short-term gains, such as the short-
term reduction in unemployment. It is now widely realized that such 
policies are not only ineﬀ ective in the long run but, more importantly, 
lead to undesirable increases in macroeconomic instability. Given that 
it has been diﬃ  cult to curb the desire to inﬂ ate, the best approach for 
the region has been institutional reform eliminating this discretion 
from policy making. Bosnia and Herzegovina and Bulgaria both have 
currency boards. Other countries, such as Slovenia, Croatia, and Ma-
cedonia, attempt to stabilize macroeconomic conditions by following 
some sort of ﬁ xed exchange rate policy. Th e reduction in policy vola-
tility is important for at least two reasons: (1) as argued above, more 
There is a lack of support for 
policies aiming to increase the 
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stability leads to higher savings (investment) rates; and (2) macroeco-
nomic stability reduces inequality. Indeed on the second point, several 
studies attempting to determine which growth factors aﬀ ect inequality 
have discovered that only one factor is signiﬁ cant—inﬂ ation (or the 
volatility of inﬂ ation). 
Fiscal policy is the other determinant of macroeconomic stability. Here, 
constraining policy makers to behave within a framework guaranteeing 
stability is much more complicated. Quantitative restrictions, such as 
the 3 percent cap on deﬁ cits in the Stability and Growth Pact, have 
their strong advocates, but they are also bitterly criticized because they 
restrict policy too much at the wrong time or because violations of such 
rules are diﬃ  cult to punish. We suggest an alternative solution. Fiscal 
policy should be constrained by checks and balances rather than by 
quantitative targets. A lack of checks and balances create an environ-
ment allowing ﬁ scal policy to be used for opportunistic reasons. Th e 
extensive use of ﬁ scal policy creates macroeconomic volatility and 
overall instability. In short, the scheme is the following:
 More political constraints  lower variability of ﬁ scal policy  
 lower macroeconomic instability  more saving  higher growth
Which political constraints should be imposed? Th e goal is to 
reduce the executive branch’s ability to use spending and taxation in 
an opportunistic manner, such as to improve an incumbent’s chances 
for reelection. Empirical evidence clearly illustrates that countries with 
more vetoes on the executive’s decision-making power have more stable 
ﬁ scal policies. Th ere are various ways of increasing checks and balances 
in a country, such as an independent judiciary that can challenge go-
vernment decisions or a budgetary process that will allow the legislature 
to curb executive power. Of course, the latter is meaningful only if 
the executive and the legislature have diﬀ erent sources of legitimacy. If 
governments are simply appointed by the parliament, it is diﬃ  cult to 
argue that legislature will veto the executive’s decisions.  
Fiscal policy should be 
constrained by checks and 
balances rather than by 
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  C E N T E R  F O R  P O L I C Y  S T U D I E S  W O R K I N G  P A P E R S  S E R I E S
28
A measure of veto points was constructed by Witold Henisz and is 
reported in the table below.4 
Th e index ranges from 0 (no constraints) to 1 (all possible const-
raints, meaning an independently elected executive with a bicameral 
parliament, independent judiciary, and federal structure). Th e index 
also adjusts for the political alignment across branches (in other words, 
if the executive and the parliament are from the same party, then the 
likelihood of vetoing a decision can be expected to be lower). For Sout-
heast Europe, there is much to be desired. Only Bulgaria, Greece, and 
Slovenia have scores close to the more developed economies (where the 
index is usually between 0.75 and 0.85). Institutional reform that will 
4 Witold J. Henisz, “Th e Institutional Environment for Economic Growth,” Economics 
and Politics 12:1 (2000).
Table 4
Political Constraints on the Executive
Country Political Constraints
Average 0.38
Albania
Bulgaria
Greece
Romania
Turkey
0.52
0.74
0.70
0.56
0.62
Serbia and Montenegro
Bosnia and Herzegovina 
Croatia
Macedonia
Slovenia
0.46
0.00
—
0.41
0.73
Source: Witold J. Henisz, “Th e Institutional Environment for Economic 
Growth,” Economics and Politics 12: 1 (2000).
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strengthen the separation of power should be high on the agenda for se-
veral of the countries. Of course, checks and balances have many other 
desirable implications that reinforce the need for institutional reform. 
Th e problem is that in their focus on imposing the correct policies 
instead of creating the correct structure of the policy process, the inter-
national community is not very interested in promoting institutional 
solutions that will increase the veto possibilities in the decision-making 
process. 
Overall, macroeconomic stability can be the outcome of policy 
conducted in a discretionary way or a result of an institutional arran-
gement that restricts policy makers in certain ways. In our view, the 
institutional solution—by separation of powers in the case of ﬁ scal 
policy or by having an explicit monetary target in the case of monetary 
policy—seems to provide a better environment for long-term strategic 
planning by consumers and ﬁ rms. 
Continuing the policy and institutional reforms leading to mac-
roeconomic and social stability is well understood by most policy 
makers. Th e sections above point out three critical dimensions in this 
respect—the importance of promoting high saving, the importance of 
checks and balances, and the importance of monetary stability. One 
other important point must be mentioned. It is not new, but its im-
portance is often forgotten. Demographics is a challenge that is often 
neglected. Th e ﬁ rst and rather obvious dimension is the aging of the 
population. With more people going into retirement, the burden on 
the working population will increase since most pension outlays are 
on a pay-as-you-go basis. Th e second and probably more important 
dimension of population dynamics is brain drain. Th ere is a continuous 
emigration of young people with high potential. Improving growth will 
reverse this ﬂ ow, but the question is whether one needs a more active 
policy to change the direction of ﬂ ows. In our view, there is a clear need 
to be proactive in this respect because human outﬂ ows can generate 
self-fulﬁ lling growth disasters. Th e country sets aside revenue to imp-
rove education opportunities, but this investment provides no return if 
people leave the country. Taxes are high, investment in human capital 
There is a continuous 
emigration of young people 
with high potential. Thus there 
is a clear need to be proactive 
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is high, but the return is nonexistent. Th is leads to low growth and a 
higher desire to emigrate, which of course exacerbates the problem. At 
present, the demographic challenge is largely neglected, and emigration 
is perceived as an instrument for reducing unemployment. 
1 . 8  G e t t i n g  Pe r c e p t i o n s  R i g h t
Since growth policies, even if successful in the medium term, do not 
seem to create their own social support in the Balkans, it is obvious 
that the policy mix should include a set of policies aimed at fostering 
such support. Th is reformulation means that while the full set of 
reform policies will still be in place, it will be complemented by a set of 
support-enhancing policies, which will need their share of political and 
administrative time and resources. Promoting economic growth should 
not be conceived of as a suﬃ  cient constituency-building policy. In this 
context, social optimism and the will for saving should be analyzed 
both as an economic and noneconomic phenomenon. 
Th e support-enhancing set of policies must have two focal points
—the ﬁ rst is to increase support for reform among the social groups 
who are most likely to provide it; the second is to decrease resistance to 
reform from the social groups who are most likely to resort to it.
From this point of view, it is important to have a model, however 
generalized, of the main social groups as they are situated along the 
(potential support for) reform axis. Th is analytical framework includes 
the political economy model based on Perotti and Hellman’s identiﬁ ca-
tion of types of social actors—losers, winners, and partial winners.5 Th e 
social actors with diverse interests and relative strength constantly inter-
act in the political space, and the result of their interactions are shifting 
coalitions with speciﬁ c and varying attitudes toward reform policies.
Since growth policies, even 
if successful in the medium 
term, do not seem to create 
their own social support in the 
Balkans, it is obvious that 
the policy mix should include 
a set of policies aimed at 
fostering such support.
5 See Perotti, Roberto, “Income Distribution, Fiscal Policy, and Delays in Stabilization,” 
Journal of Policy Reform,  1: 4 (1996)  pp. 335-55 and World Bank, Transition: the First 
Ten Years  (Washington D.C.: Th e World Bank, 2002).
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If this model is taken as a starting point, policies aiming at increasing 
support for reform focus on the long-term winners from reforms. On 
the other hand, the focus of the policies aiming at decreasing resistance 
to reform is naturally the group of reform losers. Th e pivotal point here 
is that the suggested policies are at the expense of the third group—the 
winners from partial reforms who oppose their completion.
Th is third group, the predatory elites, exists in all transition count-
ries but seems especially strong in Southeast Europe. Th eir predatory 
projects slash the eﬀ ectiveness of social support programs (aiming at 
the losers of reforms) by channeling these programs’ resources away 
from the target groups. Th ese predatory projects also hamper the com-
petitiveness and proﬁ tability of authentic market agents (and thus their 
relative social strength) by preventing competition through the creation 
and protection of monopolized niches and by threatening to damage 
the interests and rights of legitimate businesses through nonmarket 
means. Ultimately, the predatory projects in Southeast Europe have 
been able to drain the savings of both households and ﬁ rms, causing 
macroeconomic catastrophes. Th is social group’s presence and strength 
is one of the region’s particular features, and economic policies must 
recognize this. Th is is why anticrime policies are a major component of 
building proreform constituencies.
Of course, the composition, background, motivation, and incenti-
ves of all three groups are very speciﬁ c for each separate country in the 
region, so the details of the policies suggested here must be tailored to 
these speciﬁ cs. However, four general policy lines can be outlined as 
seemingly relevant and important within the context of the region.
Th e ﬁ rst two suggested policies target the winners of reforms—the 
competitive entrepreneurs who fare best in the type of economic and 
business environment space toward which the Southeast European 
economies are striving. Th e ﬁ rst policy recommendation concerns 
the deﬁ nition and enforcement of property rights. One reason why 
competitive entrepreneurs are unsuccessful relative to predatory elites 
in the Balkans is the fact that property rights are poorly deﬁ ned and 
  C E N T E R  F O R  P O L I C Y  S T U D I E S  W O R K I N G  P A P E R S  S E R I E S
32
barely enforced. Th is helps predatory elites establish strong positions 
through nonmarket means, carve out monopolistic niches, engage suc-
cessfully in unfair competitive practices, and limit the proﬁ t margins 
of authentic market agents, which prevents the growth of their relative 
social importance. On the other hand, clarity and improved enforce-
ment of property rights is the natural habitat of modern functioning 
competitive markets and their agents. More speciﬁ cally, Southeast 
European governments should devote resources to creating rules foste-
ring competition and ﬁ nancial discipline, establish transparent proce-
dures in dealing with the private sector, and build a system of property 
and contract enforcement balanced in terms of competencies and 
responsibilities that eﬃ  ciently serves economic activities.
Th e second recommended policy targets the policy formulation 
procedures themselves. Th is means that resources should be devoted 
to establish, maintain, and enhance the policy dialogue within each 
country. Such a course of action will provide three important beneﬁ ts 
to the winners of reform. First, active participation in setting the reform 
agenda will make authentic economic agents feel a sense of ownership 
over the policy package. Th ese people will have conﬁ dence in the re-
form process and reward it with greater optimism and the propensity 
to save. Second, establishing a policy dialogue will lead to greater eﬀ ort 
by dialogue participants to assess the impact of the proposed policies 
before they actually happen. Th is will lead to a higher level of knowled-
ge about the economy and better preparedness of all parties involved in 
the policies’ actual impact, ultimately decreasing the social cost of their 
introduction. Th ird, an enhanced policy dialogue will decrease the pro-
pensity of policy makers to change policies just for the sake of change, 
increasing the stability of the rules of the game. Th is will decrease the 
risks associated with developing long-term business strategies with 
various beneﬁ ts for proﬁ ts and savings. In addition to these three bene-
ﬁ ts for the winners of reform, an enhanced policy dialogue will beneﬁ t 
the reform agenda itself and society as a whole by legitimizing success, 
validating the winners’ point of view, and thus possibly increasing the 
Active participation in setting 
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winners’ self esteem and individual perceptions about their present and 
future status.
Th e last two suggested policies target the losers of reforms with the 
goal of alleviating their losses and decreasing their resistance against 
further reforms. Th e ﬁ rst recommendation is to adopt a strategy of 
targeting relatively small groups of socially disadvantaged people rather 
than retaining the socialist-inherited tendency to disburse aid to the 
entire population. Th is change of focus should be coupled with signiﬁ -
cant attention to the administration’s ability to implement the policies 
eﬃ  ciently (as a result of bureaucracy building). When this happens, the 
personal incomes and consumption of the most disadvantaged groups 
will be signiﬁ cantly enhanced at a relatively low level of burden for the 
rest of society.
Th e second recommendation concerns not only policy makers but 
also the international community as a whole. It is related to improving 
the process of social learning about both democracy and the market 
economy. Th e gap between people’s initial expectations in Southeast 
Europe and the reality after more than a decade of reform leaves a 
vast space for alternative explanations. In such an environment, many 
actors have incentives to signiﬁ cantly distort the truth or simply to 
resort to false theorizing, which often becomes embedded in the minds 
of many people, shaping their choices and causing a vicious circle of 
uninformed choices leading to disastrous results. Th is serves as a basis 
for false theories and uninformed choices. A concerted eﬀ ort is needed 
to break this vicious circle of social learning. Local civil-society orga-
nizations seem to be the best group to generate reliable and rigorous 
knowledge about democracy and market economy. Th ey have not yet 
been branded as adverse elites by the losers of reforms and also have 
the credibility to acquire knowledge and formulate messages that may 
inform and improve the decisions made by individuals.
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2 .  B R I N G I N G  T H E  S TAT E  I N
Th e policy message coming from academic literature on transition is 
that development requires an eﬀ ective state; one that plays “a catalytic, 
facilitating role, encouraging and complementing activities of private 
business and individuals,” a state where “ambitions are matched with 
capabilities.”6 Postcommunist countries were faced with the task of 
downsizing government involvement while improving bureaucratic 
capacity. Th is worked in Central Europe but failed in the Balkans, 
where transition took the form of state building in the literal sense 
of the word. Th e challenge is how to build a trustworthy state that is 
also legitimate for its citizens. At present, public trust in institutions 
is generally low.7 Th e Balkans are seen as corrupt and ineﬃ  cient, a 
region where governments only nominally control sizable parts of their 
territories, and where organized crime is an indicator of state weakness 
and also a factor for weakening the state. Th e region presents a strange 
mixture of weak states, former failed states, and present protectorates.
Perhaps the following classiﬁ cation of political regimes in the 
Balkans could be useful:
• Countries approaching an advanced stage of democratization:8 
Romania and Bulgaria;
• Countries in an apparently sustainable process of democratization: 
Croatia;
• Countries in the (postcrisis) process of democratization: Albania;
• Countries starting the democratization process: Serbia and 
Montenegro;
6 World Bank, Th e State in the Changing World (Washington, D.C.: Th e World Bank, 
1997).
7 Data from International IDEA: International Institute for Democracy and Electoral 
Assistance. http://www.idea.int.
8 Democratization means the process of building democracy. It is taken to include at 
least two or three more or less free and fair elections and at least one orderly change of 
the parties in government.
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• Countries recovering from a severe political crisis (the break-down 
of democratization): Macedonia;
• Countries with a signiﬁ cant international security and political 
presence (quasiprotectorates): Bosnia and Herzegovina;
• Territories beginning the democratization process: Montenegro;
• Territories that are de facto international protectorates: Kosovo;
• Political entities within quasiprotectorates: the Federation of Bosnia 
and Herzegovina and the Republic Srpska.
• Divided cities, cities that are out of control of their central 
government, and villages or cities under special international care: a 
number of them are in Kosovo (for example, Kosovska Mitrovica), 
Bosnia and Herzegovina (for example, Brcko), and Macedonia (for 
example, Sipkovica).
 
Clearly, the types of failed or weak states emerging from this 
classiﬁ cation span most of what can be found in the rest of the world. 
Th e diﬀ erence is perhaps in the level and extant of international involve-
ment, although the same can be said for a number of other regions. 
Proximity to the European Union is what separates the Balkans from 
most other postconﬂ ict regions in the world. 
2 . 1  D e f i n i n g  N o t i o n s  o f  We a k  S t a t e  
  a n d  F a i l e d  S t a t e
Th e notions of “weak state,” “failed state,” “collapsed state,” and the even 
more playful notions of “hard states” and “soft states” became critical 
elements in the current discourse on the state. But, in most cases, they 
are used as metaphors and less often as analytical terms. In theoretical 
terms, a failed state represents a return to what Hobbes called the 
state of nature. Kaplan prefers to describe this condition as “criminal 
anarchy.”9 It represents the disappearance of the legitimate monopoly 
Proximity to the European 
Union is what separates 
the Balkans from most 
other postconfl ict regions 
in the world.
9 Robert Kaplan, Th e Coming Anarchy: Shattering the Dreams of the Post Cold War (New 
York: Random House, 2000).
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of violence over a certain territory that formally has been recognized as 
a state. Security and justice as public goods are either not provided or 
provided by illegitimate private agents. Albania in the spring of 1997 
represents a classic case of state failure. Th e structures that should have 
guaranteed the rule of law failed completely. In the words of Badie and 
Birnbaum, “As the decision-making center of government, the state is 
paralyzed and inoperative: laws are not made, order is not preserved, 
and societal cohesion is not enhanced.”10 Th ere was no judicial system. 
To the extent that police were found on the streets, they were agents 
of private violence. A substantial amount of weapons were seized by 
the population; the state of insecurity was total. Th e state was neither 
taxing nor spending. 
A weak state can be deﬁ ned as a state that fails to protect citizens’ 
rights and property rights. A weak state is not necessarily a state that 
does not dispose of signiﬁ cant resources. In the Balkans, some states are 
weak in that sense as well. Th us, Albania and Kosovo are weak in the 
key sense of the rule of law being weak, but they are also weak in the 
sense that they do not really inﬂ uence economic development. Th is can 
be seen from the level and structure of their public ﬁ nances. Tax reve-
nues hover around 10–15% of GDP, while public expenditures exceed 
this ﬁ gure by about 10% of GDP; this is eﬀ ectively the ﬁ scal deﬁ cit. 
Most public investments are part of the international reconstruction 
eﬀ ort or are ﬁ nanced from international aid or with soft loans. Th ese 
conditions could be taken as the prototype of a weak state.
Other states in the region collect signiﬁ cant resources in public 
revenue and have even larger public expenditures. Th us, a number of 
states or territories spend more than 50% of their GDP via the budget. 
Th ese states also collect substantial revenue. In that sense, a number of 
Balkan states cannot be called weak. However, as in other developing 
countries, the sources of revenue and structure of expenditures show 
signiﬁ cant weaknesses or ineﬃ  ciencies. Th ere is no need to go into 
10 Bertrand Badie and Pierre Birnbaum, Sociology of the State (Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press, 1983). 
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details, but some general characteristics should be given. On the 
revenue side, the common problem is that the tax base is rather narrow. 
Th ere is a large and growing informal economy, and taxes are mostly 
collected from state owned companies and consumers. Revenues from 
tariﬀ s are also essential in a number of cases. On the expenditure side, 
a substantial amount of money is spent on wages and salaries, the 
military, and transfers and subsidies, with a relatively small amount on 
public investment. Public expenditures are “selectively paternalistic,” 
a euphemism for what is otherwise called a captured state.11
    
2 . 2  M o d e s  o f  S t a t e  We a k n e s s
In his inﬂ uential work Strong States, Weak Societies, Joel Migdal deﬁ ned 
the strong state as one with high capabilities to achieve its goals, including 
the “capacities to penetrate society, regulate social relationships, extract 
resources, and appropriate or use resources in determined ways.”12
 In this respect, we can deﬁ ne state weakness either as the weakness 
of the state’s autonomous role or as the weakness of its organization 
capacities. Th e weak state is either a captured state or a state with an 
ineﬃ  cient bureaucracy. However, in Bringing the State Back In, Evans, 
Rueschmeyer, and Skocpol demonstrated that the general judgments 
about a state’s strength can be misleading. Th ey have demonstrated 
that there is not necessarily a positive relationship among diﬀ erent 
kinds of state capacities. A state can be eﬃ  cient as a tax collector but 
a bad public manager. It can succeed in implementing certain policies 
and fail at implementing others. One of the new phenomena that can 
be observed is the emergence of the “cunning state,” a state that is 
11 For more, see Vladmir Gligorov, “Th e Role of the State in the Balkans,” in Balkan 
Reconstruction: Economic Aspects, ed. Vladimir Gligorov (Vienna: WIIW, 2000).
12 Joel Migdal, Strong Societies and Weak States: State-Society Relations and State 
Capabilities in the Th ird World (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1988).
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selectively weak but makes use of its perceived weakness.13 Th e fact that 
most weak states are democracies creates conditions for the strategy of 
selective weakness. Balancing between pressure from the international 
community and pressure from the public, political actors manage to 
be weak in areas that are unimportant for the regime’s survival while 
being suﬃ  ciently strong enough when it comes to the governing elite’s 
interests.
 
2 . 3  T h e  S o u r c e s  o f  S t a t e  We a k n e s s  
  i n  t h e  B a l k a n s
Historians are tempted to view the current crisis of the state in the 
Balkans as a result of the delayed and unﬁ nished process of state 
building, which is a distinctive feature of political development in the 
Balkans in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. In their 
view, state weakness is historically speciﬁ c for the region. But such 
an explanation is a dead end for understanding the dynamics of the 
reproduction of state weakness in the Balkans. Th ree other domestic 
sources of state weakness are of greater importance. Th ese are the 
impact of political opening, the impact of the constitutional choices, 
and the impact of the dominant project of postcommunist elites.
 
Political Opening
It is perhaps warranted to argue that the malfunctioning of postcom-
munist states in the Balkans reﬂ ects a peculiar “paradox of political 
opening.” As the political and ideological conditions necessary to 
advance democracy transpired, the institutional tools of governance 
available to these societies—bureaucratic structures and administrative 
13 On the “cunning state,” see Shalini Randeria and Ivan Krastev,  in Unraveling Ties, eds. 
Yehuda Elkana, Ivan Krastev, Elisio Macamo, Shalini Randeria (Frankfurt, New York: 
Campus Verlag, 2002).
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agencies—were adversely aﬀ ected by the swift and unpredictable 
changes. Th e very implosion of the communist ediﬁ ce of power that 
marked the end of dictatorships also aggravated institutional frag-
mentation and accelerated administrative decay. Hardly surprisingly, 
the changes of 1989 had a profoundly demoralizing eﬀ ect on the 
communist-created civil service. To some extent, this eﬀ ect might be 
attributed to ideological causes. After all, bureaucratic cadres, especially 
those who occupied important positions, were selected according to 
ideological criteria, and the spectacular breakdown of their ideological 
project must have had an unsettling eﬀ ect on many of them. But 
it is not necessary to picture low- and mid-level administrators in 
communist countries as angst-ridden individuals who have experienced 
an existential loss of meaning to understand how political change 
may precipitate the evaporation of intangibles that keep personnel 
morale high. Th e collapse of communist regimes also gave rise to 
more mundane questions that determine the ﬂ ows of motivational 
energies of bureaucrats in all times and places. Th e stability of hitherto 
institutionalized career patterns was shattered, privileges that were 
taken for granted melted in the air, and “ubiquitous routines” that 
created a sense of security were disrupted. In sum, no matter how one 
interprets the events of 1989—as a high drama featuring the fall of 
ideologies and climactic conﬂ icts of worldviews or a more prosaic story 
of how civil servant cope with confusion, anxiety, and resentment—it 
is imperative to include the civil service’s demoralization among the 
immediate eﬀ ects of the collapse of state socialism. 
Furthermore, the robustness of state structures was adversely af-
fected by the complex, multifaceted process of separation of party and 
state. While most obviously a sine qua non for democratization, this 
development also aggravated the dysfunctionality of state apparatuses. 
Simply put, nomenklatura cadres who were “leaving” the state en masse 
to begin a new life as agents of civil society also took the wherewithal 
indispensable for governance: material assets (means of transportation, 
means of communication, money) as well as intangible resources (in-
formation, knowledge, the logistical capacity to organize things and 
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people). In the aftermath of this messy separation, state institutions 
frequently resembled empty shells bereft of infrastructural potential. 
Constitutional Choices
In order to estimate the impact of constitutional choices on the re-
production of state weakness in the Balkans, we must take a compa-
rative perspective. On the eve of the 1989 revolutions, the territory 
comprising the nine communist countries in Europe contained 69 
major nationalities. Over the next six years, more than three-quarters of 
these nationalities (a total of 54) were engaged in ethnoconstitutional 
crises with at least one government over issues of civil rights, greater 
participation in the central government’s decision-making process, 
communal autonomy, or independence. A full 98% of these crises 
entailed claims to some form of statehood—either territorial auto-
nomy within an existing state or complete independence. A ﬁ fth 
of these nationalities engaged in violence against at least one of the 
governments. By the end of the decade, this violence had developed 
into severe armed conﬂ ict for seven nationalities—the Abkhazians in 
Georgia, the Albanians in Serbia, the Armenians in Azerbaijan, the 
Bosniacs in Bosnia, the Chechens in Russia, the Croats in Bosnia, and 
the Serbs in both Bosnia and Croatia.14 More than the diﬃ  culty of 
transiting from an economy based on plan to market, the challenge 
of building democracy in multiethnic postcommunist Europe remains 
formidable.
But one thread is visible in the postcommunist puzzle of success 
and failure: only nation-states have succeeded in the European 
integration project. And their cultural minorities succeeded with them. 
Th ese are the countries that have grown increasingly democratic and 
14 From Philip Roeder, “National Self-Determination and Postcommunist Popular 
Sovereignty,” in Nationalism after Communism. Lessons Learned, eds. Alina Pippidi 
and Ivan Krastev (Budapest: Central European University Press, 2004).
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civic while ethnic federations broke up, and disputed states ultimately 
became weak states or even failed states. Th is can be seen as merely 
stating the obvious—countries with fewer constraints did better, and 
ethnic heterogeneity was always seen as a traditional constraint on 
democracy. But it is indeed more complicated than that. Th e Baltic 
republics, Slovakia, Bulgaria, and Romania have also faced problems 
related to ethnic heterogeneity during their transition. A share of the 
region’s ubiquitous ethnic conﬂ ict belonged to the successful part 
of postcommunist Europe. In all fairness, this part was also better 
equipped to deal with this challenge. Local institutions were more ﬁ t 
or better chosen, national politicians and the international community 
made less mistakes, and external destabilizing factors were better 
controlled. Th e European integration of these countries was well served 
by and prepared for during a previous phase of nation building and 
state consolidation, necessary after decades of Soviet domination. 
While initial conditions of transformations, especially at the level 
of state building, vary greatly, some clear lessons do emerge out of a 
comparison between successful and unsuccessful state building projects 
in postcommunist Europe. It seems, therefore, that the successful 
management of multiethnicity in Eastern Europe cannot succeed 
without strong and unitary states. Achieving those may need, as in 
the Baltic republics, a period of intermediate or transitory institutions 
that have the clear goal of producing such states. At the other end of 
the continuum, a misunderstanding of this fact produced nearly failed 
states in countries such as Moldova. Th ese are states that cannot protect 
majorities or minorities, are incapable of mobilizing their citizens 
around a project on the scale of European integration, and which are 
reduced to the passive role of producing large-scale emigration to the 
more successful regions of Europe. While considerable repatriation has 
occurred in the Baltic states, in Albania, Moldova, and Ukraine, there 
is a mass desertion by citizens ﬂ eeing their failed states. Th is is not the 
usual exodus of the poor toward rich countries, but the tacit desertion 
of failed national projects. Europe’s eastern border can barely stop an 
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invasion that translates into huge fractions of the total workforce of 
these countries seeking labor elsewhere. Interpreting this quiet disaster 
simply as a lack of economic success would be a mistake. When a 
country’s entire active workforce would leave if given the chance, we 
are dealing with state failure, including the failure to produce national 
identity and mobilization around a common national project. Failed 
states create hopeless societies, who become sponsors of state failure.  
In each country, political elites are responsible for managing state 
building, but we have also witnessed considerable international assist-
ance and intervention in constitutional matters, and its role has been 
important in some countries, for better and for worse. To sum it up, 
the question is how to assist state consolidation and the enforcement 
of rights as equally legitimate processes, not how to reorganize the state 
for ethnic groups to share power as the main strategy of ensuring rights. 
Power-sharing without rights enforcement is not helpful.15 Even worse, 
it creates nonfunctional states—when what are needed are states with 
strong implementation capacity—or ethnic clienteles, who sabotage 
common national projects. Th is is the main reason why countries with 
more than one ethnic group have weak economies. A country must be 
a common project, not a playground of ethnic clienteles, to experience 
successful development.16
Th e successful part of postcommunist Europe is the one where 
constitutional arrangements were classic. Nations deﬁ ned as civic 
nations consisting of individuals, not communities, where rights 
and state support for cultural diﬀ erence is clearly stated, including 
nondiscriminative employment, education in diﬀ erent languages, and 
the use of minority languages in local governments and courts where 
minorities constitute more than 15–20% of the local population. 
15 From Florian Bieber, “Power Sharing as Ethnic Representation in Postconﬂ ict 
Societies,” in Nationalism after Communism. Lessons Learned, eds. Alina Pippidi and 
Ivan Krastev (Budapest: Central European University Press, 2004).
16 See William Easterly and Ross Levine, “Africa’s Growth Tragedy: Policies and Ethnic 
Divisions,” Quarterly Journal of Economics 112 (1997), pp. 1203–50. 
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Representation of minorities through proportional electoral systems 
and reserved seats for smaller groups in national parliaments have also 
been a good recipe. In Romania, Bulgaria, and Slovakia, the main parties 
of ethnic minorities have become constant participants in government 
coalitions. Ethnofederalism, to the contrary, emerged with a poor 
record for conﬂ ict prevention or containment from the postcommunist 
transition. It fostered ethnic polarization, multiplied institutional 
weapons, and increased the likelihood of both ethnoconstitutional 
conﬂ ict and violence.17 
Ethnofederalism is sometimes unavoidable as a cease-ﬁ re strategy, 
but the Bosnian experiment shows that even this is not encouraging. 
Th e idea of ethnofederalism as an institution providing justice for all 
and diminishing conﬂ ict in the long run should be revisited. What 
worked in postcommunist Europe were formulas to make unitary 
states more inclusive and more accountable, through the adoption 
of international law on minorities, (strong) external conditionality so 
these policies were implemented successfully, and national cooperative 
politics. Th is is the package that has produced successful states and fair 
political societies. Th is does not rule out the case for federalism based 
on grounds other than ethnic concentration, but the fact remains that 
none of the postcommunist countries that had a successful democratic 
transition was a federal state. Institutional innovation should be 
discouraged when unnecessary, especially in a region where state 
consolidation should not be taken for granted. 
Th eorists and human rights activists alike agree that it is diﬃ  cult 
for unitary states to be ethnically neutral. Ethnic neutrality should, 
however, be viewed in concrete, not absolute, terms. States have an 
interest to preserve the majority language as the main language of 
communication. But this should not be viewed as ethnicism if the use 
of minority languages is also ensured. Constitutions are modiﬁ ed daily 
17 From Roeder and Valerie Bunce, “Is Ethnofederalism the Solution or the Problem,” 
in Nationalism after Communism. Lessons Learned, eds. Alina Pippidi and Ivan Krastev 
(Budapest: Central European University Press, 2004). 
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to make languages oﬃ  cial, leading to intense battles around symbols of 
supremacy. It is more important that international legislation is adopted 
and implemented, that it is given a solid logistical basis, allowing people 
speaking a minority language to have equal opportunities with those 
who speak the majority one. Th e focus should be on practice, not 
symbols. Consolidated states are not possible if their structure is con-
tinuously challenged. It is not modiﬁ cations of structure but rather of 
operation that are necessary to ensure minorities’ rights. Th e conclusion 
of our research was that international involvement in conﬂ ict resolution 
tends to favor the ethnofederalist type of constitutional arrangements. 
But such arrangements are among factors for state failure in the 
Balkans.
Th e Dominant Project of the Elites
During the transitions, the state’s organizational supremacy was 
challenged. In some postcommunist countries in the Balkans, this 
challenge was launched by ethnic elites in pursuit of an alternative 
state project. Most frequently, and in the former Yugoslavia, the 
logistical outﬂ anking of the state was fomented by newfangled col-
lective actors who strove to gain control over the currency for which 
social organizations compete—namely, social control. Th e nature of 
this speciﬁ c form of logistical conﬂ ict can only become clear if the 
historically unique context in which the collapse of state socialism 
occurred is properly understood. After decades of extracting from 
society, communist regimes created and maintained an enormous public 
domain that served as a depository of all productive societal resources. 
It was precisely this domain that the state’s competitors targeted after 
1989. Th e dominant predatory elite project in postcommunism is 
extraction from the state. Th e postcommunist regimes resembled oil 
regimes, where oil was the public property to be privatized. Hence state 
building can be meaningfully construed as the protracted process of 
oﬀ setting and overcoming the organizational, institutional, and social 
consequences of this elite project.
The dominant predatory elite 
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A crucial institutional corollary of extraction from the state is the 
privatization of decision-making mechanisms or the exercise of go-
vernmental prerogatives on behalf of predatory interests. From a state-
building perspective, this privatization is much more damaging than 
the theft of material assets or the distribution of state-held assets among 
elites. At times, the privatization of decision-making mechanisms 
results in the adoption of rules favoring monopolists and rent-see-
kers (in other words, state capture). More frequently, however, it is a 
prelude to local capture or the de facto exploitation of resource-rich 
public zones (the capture of state fragments). While state capture may 
be depicted as a form of governance, the series of local captures that 
swept through the Balkans in the 1990s are most adequately described 
as the neutralization (perhaps even sabotage) of governance. 
As a result of the privatization of decision-making mechanisms, 
multiple normative orders begin to emerge. Diﬀ erent sets of rules are 
applied to diﬀ erent groups of actors, and sometimes the role of rules is 
thoroughly eclipsed by the persistent imposition of ad hoc decisions. 
In and of itself, this so-called heterogeneity of orders is probably not 
lamentable. It may attest to the ﬂ exibility of state institutions that react 
adequately to constituencies with diverse needs. As a manifestation of 
insider entrepreneurship, however, it may be destructive. Th e sustaina-
bility of governance orders depends on the reactions of apparatuses or 
what Weber called “specialized staﬀ .” But when decision-making proce-
dures are privatized, the staﬀ  acts when it should not, fails to act when 
it should, and reacts in a diﬀ erent manner in response to similar signals. 
State weakness, then, manifests itself as the radical unpredictability of 
the reactions of rule-enforcers. Consequently, bureaucracy building in-
volves reestablishing control over captured locales, rechanneling ﬂ ows 
of information toward decision makers, and streamlining the spontane-
ously emerging heterogeneity of normative orders
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2 . 4  I n t e r n a t i o n a l  S o u r c e s  
  f o r  t h e  R e p r o d u c t i o n  o f  We a k  S t a t e s
Th e paradox of transition is that successful reforms require a stable 
and durable policy consensus based on long-term development goals 
(economic growth and EU integration). At the same time, the very 
process of transformation polarizes society, producing winners and 
losers. Governments do not have a lot of room for maneuver. In order 
to stay in power, they should follow the reform agenda prescribed 
by the EU or the IMF. External constraints are institutionalized 
as currency boards and other hard instruments. Th e decision of 
international organizations to limit governments’ ﬂ exibility resulted 
from the permanent failure of governments in the Balkans to keep 
their promises. External constraints ensure policy predictability in the 
region. It is easy to understand and justify the West’s desire for policies 
that bind elites’ hands. External constraints aim at arresting the elites’ 
extraction project, but, at the same time, predatory elites use external 
pressure to excuse their lack of social responsibility.  In this sense, 
external conditionalities have a negative eﬀ ect on relations between 
politicians and the public. Governments are elected after a love aﬀ air 
with the electorate, but they are married to the international donors. 
Viewed from below, the Balkan democracies are political regimes 
where the voters are free to change governments but are very much 
constrained in changing policies. Any pressure from below is immedia-
tely labeled “populism.” Th e international factor does not see anything 
wrong with parties winning elections on a populist ticket and gover-
ning on the IMF ticket. Th is process is conceptualized as a success of 
reform. But if this development can be seen as positive in the short run, 
it is destructive in the long run. Th e recurring failure of voters to vote 
for a policy change can lead to three undesirable developments: 1) it 
can bring a political party to power that is antisystem in character (for 
example, Tudor in Romania and Seselj in Serbia); 2) it divorces elec-
tion campaigning from the actual practice of governance and makes it 
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impossible to hold politicians accountable; 3) it makes political learn-
ing ineﬀ ective. 
 
2 . 5  O v e r c o m i n g  S t a t e  We a k n e s s
Construed as an instrument of democratic governance, a strong state 
is both an institutional and a social phenomenon. It is characterized 
by the particular qualities of institutional apparatuses and by recurring 
relationship patterns between social (large and small) constituencies 
and state agents. It would perhaps make sense, then, to delineate two 
distinct analytical rubrics that may help us sort out the policy response 
to state weakness: bureaucracy building and constituency building. 
State Building as Bureaucracy Building
A cohesive corps of well-motivated civil servants is, by deﬁ nition, 
a commodity perennially in short supply in the Balkans as well as 
elsewhere. Th e maintenance of eﬃ  cient bureaucratic institutions does, 
of course, crucially depend on the allocation of material and ﬁ nancial 
resources for institution-building projects. But it is equally clear that 
such projects may succeed to the extent that they nurture what Peter 
Evans and Dietrich Rueschemeyer have felicitously called “the non-
instrumental sources of cohesion of the bureaucratic apparatus,” in 
other words intangibles like loyalty, commitment, and discipline.18 
As a general proposition, it is easy imagine how these sources will dry 
up during times of turbulent social change and political volatility. Th e 
point, of course, is not to deny the importance of civil-service reform 
18 See Peter Evans and Dietrich Rueschemeyer, “Th e State and Economic Transformation: 
Toward an Analysis of the Conditions Underlying Eﬀ ective Intervention,” in Bringing 
the State Back In, eds. Peter Evans, Dietrich Rueschemeyer and Th eda Skocpol 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985), p. 59.
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but to emphasize its long-term nature. Th e fruits of such reforms can 
be reaped, if at all, only after a long gestation period. 
Can the West be instrumental in constructing short-cuts to 
bureaucratic cohesiveness? Th e experience of countries like Bulgaria, 
Romania, and Croatia seems to suggest that ﬂ ows of Western resources 
and—equally, if not more importantly—Western recognition might, 
in fact, enhance bureaucratic performance in speciﬁ c ways. More 
concretely, it seems that local bureaucrats engaged in the process of 
European integration have a much greater incentive to be eﬃ  cient 
and persistent because the rewards they are likely to receive if their 
job is well done are ﬁ nancially signiﬁ cant and culturally meaningful. 
Such teams, therefore, may form the nuclei around which eﬃ  cient 
practices begin to gel. Lest one misinterpret the potential impact of the 
phenomenon, however, it is important to bear in mind three speciﬁ c 
features of this short-cut to bureaucratic normalcy. First, the process 
of bureaucratic regeneration will most likely take the form of the 
bureaucracy’s bifurcation, in other words, only some agencies will be 
Weberianized while the privatization of decision-making mechanisms 
will persist in others. Reform-friendly political elites will have to 
carefully map the bureaucratic terrain to comprehend the opportunities 
and constraints that the emergence of a bifurcated bureaucracy will 
create. Second, eﬃ  cient bureaucracies will not be in touch with large 
local constituencies. Th ey will accord priority to their relationship with 
fellow Eurocrats in Brussels. Conversely, bureaucracies whose primary 
function is addressing the needs of large local constituencies will face 
much less potent incentives to reform. However—and that is the 
third point—some spill-over eﬀ ects from the improved performance 
of some segments of bureaucracies may trickle down to these local 
constituencies. Put diﬀ erently, the process of bureaucracy building will 
be mediated in a particular fashion. Ambitious technocrats who covet 
Brussels’s recognition may become the principals who have an incentive 
to discipline unruly agents. It is crucial, therefore, that such spill-over 
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eﬀ ects be properly identiﬁ ed, managed, and magniﬁ ed (for example, 
through fostering proeﬃ  ciency coalitions within the civil service). 
State Building as Constituency Building
Constituency building is the second broad issue that may help to 
overcome state weakness in the Balkans. As a social phenomenon, a 
so-called strong state is a multifaced and yet fairly coherent collective 
actor that may resist the intrusive entreaties of rent-seekers, enjoy the 
trust of the citizenry, and generate positive synergy in its relations with 
productive societal groups. Th ese are precisely the social projects that 
weak states in the Balkans are ill-equipped to carry out.
To begin with, postcommunist states ﬁ nd it very diﬃ  cult to 
dislodge entrenched predators. Network connections that sustain 
rent-seeking are remarkably resilient and will reemerge, Hydra-like, 
every time damage is inﬂ icted on them. It is important to emphasize, 
however, that state extraction is a project with dim long-term pro-
spects. In countries that do not possess natural resources—as is the 
case in all Balkan countries—predators will eventually discover that 
they have little to prey on once state-owned enterprises are stripped 
of their assets, depositors’ money is siphoned oﬀ  from banks, and IMF 
loans are “misappropriated.” Th at is why, as time passes, the other two 
facets of state incapacity—the absence of trust and failure to engage 
productive groups—should become the focal point of analysis, both 
because they have enduring signiﬁ cance and because they hold the 
key to understanding the peculiar ways in which state weakness is 
reproduced in postcommunist contexts. 
Balkan states are rarely, if ever, trusted by their citizens. Historical 
legacies and political traditions shed only limited light on this 
phenomenon. More plausibly, it may be explained in terms of the 
aftereﬀ ects of state extraction. Speciﬁ cally, the gap between states and 
citizenry widened as a result of what might be called the embezzlement 
of the state’s social capital. Social capital might be deﬁ ned as relations of 
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trust which entitles the agent to credit in the various sense of the word. 
Just as any other actor, individual or corporate, the state possesses social 
capital, and its social capital (which is quite distinct from its capacity 
to exert coercion) is measured by the willingness of citizens to give it 
credit or to enter medium- and long-term collaborative relations with 
the state’s representatives. And just like any other form of capital, this 
social capital may be extracted from the state or embezzled when it is 
employed in violation of the socially acceptable conventions regulating 
its usage. Th e empirical scenarios that might be conjured up in this 
context may feature state oﬃ  cials who urge private depositors to put 
their money in a particular bank, at which point the bank is stripped 
of its assets by the collaborators of the state oﬃ  cials; bureaucrats who 
request business information that is later passed on to competitors for 
a price; organized interests that are advised by administrative agents 
to collaborate with particular private institutions, at which point the 
former are deceived by the latter while the administrative agents receive 
their cut from the hijacked resources. In a sense, the primary target 
of this form of predatory elite behavior is not, strictly speaking, state-
controlled assets. What predators appropriate are resources held by 
nonstate agents (depositors, private companies, and organized societal 
groups). However, these schemes can only work if at critical junctures 
of the collaborative eﬀ ort the predators convince the partners they are 
about to deceive that the state is involved in the deal as a guarantor 
and backer. It is because societal actors are prepared to extend credit 
to the state that they enter the partnerships that ultimately facilitate 
conversions of power. Th erefore, societal actors’ willingness to extend 
this credit in the future will suﬀ er when the criminal intent behind the 
putative partnerships is ﬁ nally revealed. 
Th ese concrete experiences are magniﬁ ed as a result of a more general 
phenomenon, namely the experience of a spectacular exclusion of what 
might be described as productive social constituencies: entrepreneurs, 
young managers, and professionals. Th e redistribution of state-owned 
resources was a readily observable spectacle the consequences of which 
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everyone could experience. And yet, only a very few insiders partook 
in it. Arguably the most important aftereﬀ ect of state extraction, then, 
is the erection of a cultural wall delimiting the domains of exclusion 
and inclusion. Even social groups that objectively beneﬁ ted from the 
changes in the post-1989 era will subjectively consider themselves losers 
as long as they perceive that participation in the redistribution of state 
assets is the only meaningful act of inclusion. Economic achievements 
are habitually measured against political experiences—and the bitter 
taste left by the latter overshadows the positive aspects of the former. 
Under such circumstances, a tendency transpires that seriously 
hampers good democratic governance: the rise of the protest vote. 
Th is is a triply troublesome phenomenon: 1) it creates a disincentive 
for incumbents; 2) it aﬄ  icts the opposition with moral hazard; and 
3) it blocks the process of learning where publics form more or less 
adequate notions about causality, responsibility, and the institutional 
dynamic of governance. Without such rudimentary learning, democ-
ratic governance may be well nigh impossible. Th e slide into a so-
called protest-vote democracy is accelerated by the perilous impact 
of the media, which tends to perpetuate ignorance and superﬁ ciality 
rather than learning. In short, not all democratic conﬁ gurations are 
equally conducive to state building. Th e protest vote, while arguably 
not inimical to democracy per se, is certainly not conducive to better 
governance.
It is the distance, whether real or imagined, between the state 
and key social constituencies that renders possible the reproduction 
of the weak state model. Th e connections between rent-seekers and 
corrupt state agents may eventually dissipate as the reservoir of public 
resources dries up; however, the disconnectedness that marks the 
institutional position of a weak state endures. Th is reproductive cycle 
is relatively unaﬀ ected by the increased aﬄ  uence of an increased 
number of citizens. Socioeconomic data from Bulgaria and Romania 
suggests that individuals routinely link their success not to certain 
aspects of governance (for instance, more eﬃ  cient enforcement of 
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reproduction of the weak state 
model.
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property rights, the maintenance of stable local currencies, more 
eﬀ ective regulation of the ﬁ nancial sector, or the sheer reduction in 
the number of meddlesome state oﬃ  cials, a primary sign of improved 
bureaucratic performance) but to the noninterference of state agents in 
their immediate business pursuits. How to deﬁ ne personal success as 
the intersection of (privately driven) economy and (publicly managed) 
politics—this is the main challenge faced by those who believe that 
collaboration between state agencies and social actors is indispensable 
to good governance. 
Ultimately, then, it is important to distinguish, chronologically 
and analytically, between two distinct manifestations of state weakness. 
During the early stages of postcommunist restructuring, states failed 
to perform their preventive function. Th ey were unable (or unwilling) 
to prevent the looting of the public domain. Later, another, though 
not unrelated, form of malfunctioning became increasingly relevant—
the failure to perform the positive task of creating, nurturing, and 
supporting social groups that constitute the natural constituencies 
of the rule of law and market-based economic activities. Th e state’s 
agenda-setting capability is strategically very important, and perhaps it 
should be restored not on the level of societal programs, but with a view 
to stimulating particular activities of social groups whose economic 
breakthroughs would beneﬁ t the entire society. 
2 . 6  I n  S e a r c h  o f  R e s p o n s i v e  G o v e r n m e n t
Contrary to the current intellectual consensus, our report deﬁ nes 
the growing gap between the state and the key social constituencies 
as the major risk for reforming the Balkans. Reforming the public 
administration and positive changes in the economy are not suﬃ  cient to 
bridge this gap. What is needed is a new generation of democratization 
policies that focus on the quality of political representation. What 
we see as a priority is a shift from the normative approach to demo-
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cratization that focuses on democratic institutions (elections, courts, 
and media) and which is most often expressed with the idea of “ac-
countable government” or “good government” to the idea of “responsive 
government” that underlines not the state’s autonomy from civil society 
but the inﬂ uence of major social constituencies over state decisions. 
Reforming political parties should be at the center of such a search for 
responsive government. Th e building of representative parties comes 
close to our view of state building as constituency building. 
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